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Abstract—Good quality entropy sources are indispensable in most
modern cryptographic protocols. Unfortunately, many currently deployed
networked devices do not include them and may be vulnerable to Random
Number Generator (RNG) attacks. Since most of these systems allow
firmware upgrades and have serial communication facilities, the potential
for retrofitting them with secure hardware-based entropy sources exists.
To this aim, very low-cost, robust, easy to deploy solutions are required.
Here, a retrofittable, sub 10$ entropy source based on chaotic dynamics is
illustrated, capable of a 32 kbit/s rate or more and offering multiple serial
communication options including USB, I2C, SPI or USART. Operation
is based on a loop built around the Analog to Digital Converter (ADC)
hosted on a standard microcontroller.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most powerful trends recently seen in technology is
the networking of a large number of devices originally operating in
isolation. By 2020 more than 25 billion devices will be interconnected
[1]. This Internet of Things (IoT) can bring smartness to many
environments whose items gain the ability to cooperate and a richer set
of information to base their behaviors upon. At the same time, making
a huge number of devices remotely reachable poses profound security
challenges because of the immense attack surface [2].
Unfortunately, many devices being brought online lack certain
security-oriented subsystems. This is due to cost and conception, since
networking is often applied to mundane items and awareness on
security issues is still growing. In a short time, there will be a huge
legacy of networked devices missing hardware parts critical to security.
This can be long lasting since humble devices lack any upgrade lust
and are only substituted when they break, as users often fail to see
potential threats as lack of functionality. Surveys reveal that about half
of the networking devices found in businesses are already on the brink
of obsolescence [3]. To contrast this phenomena, some authors suggest
that embedded networking units should be given a scheduled end-of-
life [4]. Until this is a reality (if ever), the alternative is to minimize
the costs of patching current devices, either in manufacturing, through
design revisions, or on field, through software upgrades and hardware
retrofits.
This paper illustrates the design of a hardware primitive critical for
security, namely an entropy source, whose absence can favor Random
Number Generator (RNG) attacks (references to past incidents in [5]).
True-RNGs and hardware entropy sources are becoming mainstream
in computers [6], but are still missing from most low-cost/embedded
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Figure 1. Prototype of self-contained entropy source with USB port, including
diagnostic LEDs, control switches, trimmers, test-pads, and a DIP µC package
significantly enlarging the layout.
devices. The current proposal can be declined in multiple forms: from
a self-contained plug-in applicable on field to existing systems (Fig. 1)
to a schematic upgrade re-using an existent microcontroller (µC),
targeting manufacturers. In either case, key features are: (i) very low
cost (sub-10$ for a self-contained unit with Universal Serial Bus (USB)
connector, sub-5$ for designs where a µC is available to share); and (ii)
high interconnection flexibility (USB, I2C, SPI or USART interfaces,
depending on the adopted µC) in order to favor adoption as a retrofit.
The entropy rate that can be delivered is in the few tens kbit/s range,
depending on the µC (over 32 kbit/s have been experimentally observed
with a PIC18F2550).
Similar solutions are scarce on the market, with true-RNG retrofits
ranging from near 40$ to over 1000$ (i.e., at far higher costs, even
considering selling margins). Closest competitors are the TRNG98
modules [7], and the Simtec Entropy Key. Differently from any other
design, the current proposal is based on chaotic dynamics, rather than
direct amplification of electronic noise (thermal, avalanche, etc.), which
can make the system less susceptible to tampering and side channel
attacks [8]. It is not the first time that chaos is proposed for RNGs [9],
but the current design has the distinguished feature of re-using Analog
to Digital Converters (ADCs) readily available on µCs. ADC reuse,
originally introduced in [10], has already seen experimental validation
[8], but so far only on full-custom integrated circuits with ad-hoc
designed pipeline ADCs, where stages can be separated from each
other. Here, taking advantage of the generalized theory in [11], [12],
the approach is used for the first time on an unmodified commercial
ADC, with a successive approximation architecture and harsh operating
conditions (µC ADCs are often poorly isolated from digital noise).
This setup requires some specific design arrangements that are here
thoroughly detailed.
II. BACKGROUND: RNGS AND SECURITY
Cryptographic systems base their operation on the existence of some
secret data known to authorized users and unpredictable by others.
To warrant unpredictability, random strings are often employed, e.g.,
in keys, salts, nonces, initialization vectors, challenges, and other
one-time quantities. Generating these strings can be non-trivial, since
digital system, by nature, cannot behave randomly. Compromises
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have traditionally been made, using algorithms, known as pseudo-
RNGs, capable of expanding short seeds into irregular long sequences.
Unfortunately, this has recently lead to security incidents. In fact,
discovery of the algorithm state by an attacker provides the ability
to predict future ‘random’ quantities [13]. In some cases, RNG attacks
had a high impact, pushing big players of information technology to
incorporate true-RNGs in their larger and newer systems [6].
For simpler or legacy systems, software solutions have been de-
veloped capable of gathering noisy data (entropy) from peripherals
‘perceiving’ physical phenomena complex enough to be assumed
random. For instance, many operating systems have access to mouse
movements, key press timings, hard disk latencies, etc. Such quantities
are irregular, but may show correlations. Yet, they can be accumulated
in buffers from which good random numbers can be distilled through
operations such as hashing and the frequent re-seeding of pseudo-
RNGs [14]. This works fairly well for standard computers, but may fail
for little devices in an IoT scenario. In fact, the latter may lack most
of the peripherals needed to collect entropy (for instance, little routers,
networked thermostats, and so on do not have mouses, keyboards or
hard-disks). With this, attempts at entropy distillation may even become
counterproductive, giving a false sense of security while in fact falling
back to pseudo-RNG behavior due to lack of inputs.
The ultimate fix is clearly to bring true-RNGs even to humble
devices. Doing so in the form of hardware retrofits needs carefully
weighing the available options. Ultimately, true-RNGs are analog sys-
tems that harvest information from physical phenomena so intricated
at the microcosmic level to appear random at the macroscopic scale.
Their simplest implementation consists in the direct amplification and
acquisition of electronic noise (thermal, avalanche, etc). This can be
effective but is inherently exposed to tampering, since interference may
be easily exchanged from genuine noise, so that (expensive) shields
can be mandatory [7]. Another form of amplification is to exploit the
meta-stability of positive feedback structures. A further alternative is to
deploy phase noise in oscillators that mutually sample each other. This
lets the analog quantity be time, so that digital voltage levels can be
adopted. Furthermore, susceptibility to tampering is improved by the
more indirect harvesting. Finally, at the highest level of sophistication,
one finds circuits based on chaotic dynamics.
The chaos-based approach is inherently different from all the others.
First of all, chaotic-RNGs replicate at the circuit level some of the
features, including sensitivity to initial conditions [15], conjectured
to be at the root of randomness in natural systems. Secondly, they
harvest noise in a radically different way. Non-chaotic sources need
to continuously gather new noise samples, while chaotic source could
in principle use just the uncertainty in their start-up condition, thanks
to sensitivity to initial conditions. In practice, noise will certainly be
present throughout all the operating time, but this ends up being just
a bonus, since correct functionality does not strictly demand it. For
this reason, as long as it is independent from their inner state, noise
or interference collected during operation can often bear only minor
influence on output quality (unless it is very large, but in this case
tampering can typically be detected with ease).
III. ADC BASED TRUE-RNG
Among all possible chaotic sources, discrete time ones based on the
iteration of 1-dimensional Piece-Wise Affine Markov (PWAM) maps
[10] are very appealing. The corresponding model is
x(n+ 1) =M(x(n)) (1)
where an invariant set (here normalized to [0, 1]) exists for M(·). The
PWAM nature of M(·) assures that a partition P of [0, 1] exists such
that the dynamics, once observed through a P-induced quantization
function q(x), can be modeled through a Markov chain [11].
ADC DAC (a)
(b)
T/H T/H (c)
Figure 2. Derivation of ADC quantization error via a cascaded DAC (a); its
processing (b); and the closing of the loop to create a chaotic with a shift-type
map (c).
Shift type maps, such as
M(x) = (αx+ β) mod 1 (2)
with integer α > 1 are particularly interesting. They assure that any
subdivision of [0, 1] in α equally sized sub-intervals, wrapped around
at the invariant set boundaries, results in a Markov partition regardless
of β. Namely, the partition can be built taking any p ∈ [0, 1] and sets
Ii for i = 0, . . . α− 1, such that
Ii = {x : x ∈ [0, 1] ∧ i ≤ α((x− p) mod 1) < i+ 1} . (3)
The corresponding Markov chain has α states, with transition proba-
bilities among any two of them equal to 1/α. In other words, it is
identical to the chain describing the cast of an α-faced unbiased die
[11]. Thus, the system has the ability to generate random symbols.
Interestingly, shift maps can be easily obtained by deriving the
quantization error of an ADC, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Let ADC(V )
and DAC(m) be used to indicate the static characteristics of the ADC
and the Digital to Analog Converter (DAC), respectively. For an N bit
single ended ADC, one should ideally have
ADC(V ) =
⌊
2N
Vref
V
⌋
(4)
where Vref is the reference voltage (approximately equal to the full
scale) and a flooring ADC behavior is assumed. Quantization step is
Vref/2
N . For the complementary N bit DAC one has
DAC(m) = m
Vref
2N
(5)
so that the quantization error, estimated as show in the figure is
Verr = Vin −DAC(ADC(Vin)) = Vin − Vref
2N
⌊
2N
Vref
Vin
⌋
=
Vref
2N
(
2N
Vref
Vin −
⌊
2N
Vref
Vin
⌋)
=
Vref
2N
(
2N
Vref
Vin mod 1
)
. (6)
The expression already contains the modulus operation that character-
izes Eqn. (2). Now, assume that a further block, as shown in Fig. 2(b)
computes Vout = k(Verr + VB). Altogether
Vout =
kVref
2N
(
2N
Vref
Vin mod 1
)
+ kVB . (7)
Rearranging the terms, one has
2N
kVref
(Vout − kVB) =(
k
2N
kVref
(Vin − kVB) + k 2
N
Vref
VB
)
mod 1 . (8)
It is now sufficient to introduce the voltage-to-x transformation
x→ 2
N
kVref
(V − kVB) V → kVref
2N
x+ kVB (9)
to see that Eqn. (8) defines the map M(·), with α ≡ k and β ≡
k2NVB/Vref . From this, to obtain a dynamical system such as that
in Eqn. (1), it is enough to feed back Vout into Vin through a delay
element. The latter can be implemented as the cascade of two Track-
and-Holds (T/Hs) blocks operating in a master-slave fashion, as in
Fig. 2(c). With this, while x spans [0, 1], the voltages Vin and Vout span
[kVB , k(VB + Vref/2
N )]. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 3, from
which it is evident that some bounds are needed for the parameters.
Specifically, 2 ≤ k ≤ 2N (with k ∈ N), VB ≥ 0 and k(VB +
Vref/2
N ) ≤ Vref , i.e., VB ≤ Vref/k − Vref/2N .
Interestingly, the figure also makes evident that the ADC quantiza-
tion inherently provides a k-state Markov partition for the map. In
fact, the range [kVB , k(VB + Vref/2N )] is as wide as kVref/2N , and
contains exactly k quantization steps. Specifically, it is sufficient to
take p = (mmin + 1)Vref/2N in order to have k intervals such as
those in Eqn. (3). This is convenient, since it lets the Markov state be
directly readable from the output m of the ADC. In detail, one gets
that the spanned m values fit between
mmin =
⌊
2N
Vref
kVB
⌋
mmax =
⌊
2N
Vref
kVB + k
⌋
(10)
and that system is in state Ii when{
m = mmin + i+ 1 if i < k − 1
m = mmin ∨m = mmax if i = k − 1
. (11)
With this, one has a true-RNG that randomly picks a value in an
alphabet of k symbols at each cycle. As an example, Fig. 4 shows
the Markov chain corresponding to the setup in Fig. 3. In view of an
efficient implementation, it is clearly convenient to make k a power of
2, say 2M with M ∈ N, so that each generated value fits exactly in
M bits. Clearly, one needs M ≤ N . In principle, M should be large
so that many random bits can be generated per cycle. Yet, M and N
must often be contained to ease implementation.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION ON A µC
A. Implementation principles
Intuitively, the concepts illustrated so far can be easily materialized
by a µC based architecture as shown in Fig. 5. Since most µCs
already include an ADC, the number of external components can be
very low. The loop corresponding to the model in Eqn. (1) can be
closed via an external DAC (for instance, the MPC4901 or MPC4911,
communicating with the µC on the SPI bus). The loop gain and offset
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Figure 3. Sample map obtained from the quantization error of an ADC. Here,
N = 3, k = 4, Vref = 10V, VB = 0.4V.
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Figure 4. Markov chain corresponding to the map in Fig. 3.
can be provided by a difference amplifier (for instance, obtained by
half an LVM602 or LMV792 chip), controlling k and VB by means of
its resistors (RA to RF in the schematic). The loop delay requires two
T/H units. These can be obtained by Operational Amplifiers (OAs)
with an output enable feature, followed by suitably large capacitors
(for instance each T/H can be obtained by an LVM601). A voltage
reference is required for accurate operation. Some µCs readily provide
one, otherwise a dedicated chip (such as the MAX6004) can be used.
In the proposed architecture, the loop path goes through the µC, which
acquires the T/H output and passes the corresponding numerical data
to the external DAC via its SPI bus. The µC is also in charge of
generating the timing signals for the DAC and the T/H units. These are
transferred via 3 lines on one of the digital I/O ports. For prototyping a
stand alone unit, the PIC18F2550 µC can conveniently be selected, in
view of its low price and integrated USB bus, which favors interfacing.
In fact, many little network devices include USB connection facilities.
Alternatively, the portion of schematic in Fig. 5(b) can be added to
an existing design including a µC with some spare computational
resources. With this, costs can be further lowered.
A notable advantage of the proposal is that it makes m readily
available inside the µC. Consequently, at each cycle, the µC can
compute a random symbol from it while passing it to the DAC. The
so generated symbols can be progressively accumulated and packed in
bytes. When the µC has buffered enough of them (or when a request
μC ADC
SPI
[PIC18F2550
or similar]
DAC
DIF/
SUM/
GAIN
T/H T/H
PORT
REF
(a)
SDI
SCK
CS
LDAC
VREF
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output
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RE RF
LMV601
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Figure 5. µC based architecture implementing the proposed true-RNG. Block
diagram (a) and signal processing chain added to the µC (b).
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Figure 6. Experimental evaluation of the system prototype illustrated in Fig. 1,
set up for Nˆ = 10, N = 3, M = 2, Vref = 4.096V, VB = 192mV.
Left: shape of the implemented M(x), reconstructed by plotting mˆ(n+ 1)
vs mˆ(n). Right: statistical distribution of m.
arrives), they can be transferred to the embedding system via one of
the µC communication interfaces, for instance, the USB bus, possibly
under encryption to prevent snooping or tampering.
B. Implementation requirements
In practice, the implementation cannot be so direct and requires
some care. Specifically, it is not possible to straightforwardly deploy
the block diagram in Fig. 2, because of implementation uncertainties.
For instance, in most µC, the ADC least significant bits (lsbs) can be
quite erratic due to couplings with digital lines. Furthermore, accuracy
in the setting of VB should be in the order of half a quantization
step, but this is too fine to achieve when the ADC resolution is 8–10
bits. Any implementation attempt ignoring these matters would most
certainly fail. Fortunately, the two issues can be easily worked around
by artificially degrading the ADC resolution before computing Verr.
This can be done as follows. Assume that Nˆ is the nominal ADC
resolution and that mˆ is the actual Nˆ -bit ADC output at each cycle,
then let N be just a portion of Nˆ , so that m can be obtained by
shifting mˆ right by Nˆ − N bits. With this, the value to be passed
to the DAC can be obtained by back shifting m to the left with zero
padding. Incidentally, this permits the use of an external DACs with
a lower resolution N˜ < Nˆ , as long as N˜ ≥ N . Good N values can
be 3 to 5 bits. Furthermore, M (which determines k = 2M ) must be
taken to be strictly less than N . In fact, this lets VB be chosen so
that the Vout range lies with clearance within the ADC input range
and the OA output saturation voltages. Good M values are 2 to 4 bits,
depending on N , while good VB values let kVB fall halfway between
voltages corresponding to transition points for m.
An advantageous side effect of the artificial resolution degradation
is that it lets the µC observe the chaotic system state x via mˆ, i.e., at
a resolution Nˆ higher than the N bits required for operation. In other
words, one gains insight on the analog system state without the need
for external instrumentation. Such an opportunity can be useful in view
of self diagnostics or automatic detection of tampering attempts. As an
example, Fig. 6(a) shows a reconstruction of the iterated map obtained
by actual experimental data acquired by the µC itself.
C. Experimental validation
The proposed architecture has been extensively tested, using the
prototype illustrated in Fig. 1. For the tests, parameters have been
set as in the caption of Fig. 6. Pane (b) shows the experimentally
obtained m values and their relative frequencies. The numbers on
the graph columns indicate the output bits associated to each m
value (obtained as m mod 4). Their occurrence probability is well
balanced at approximately 1/4. Long output streams have been tested
for their information content, achieving > 0.99 bits of entropy for
each delivered output bit (estimated via a marginal entropy approach).
The NIST 800-22 suite [16] has also been applied. The corresponding
tables of outcomes cannot fit in this paper, but are worth summarizing.
The raw generator is incapable of passing all tests (though it can
already pass many of them). Yet, a minimal post-processing (by a
Von Neumann corrector or the XORing of consecutive bits) is already
sufficient for full conformance. Similarly, when the raw data produced
by the generator is used to feed the entropy distiller in the Linux
Operating System (OS), the distiller output can pass all tests.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A new architecture of a µC based true-RNG has been proposed, pro-
totyped and tested. Internally it relies on chaotic dynamics. Expected
cost is extremely low and many interconnection options are possible,
making it suitable as a retrofit for existing networked units that lack a
true-RNG and that may be exposed to RNG attacks.
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